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Between 1942 and the late 1950s, atomic piles (nuclear chain reactors) were
industrialized to generate plutonium for the first atomic weapons and later
to serve as copious sources of neutrons, radioisotopes, and electrical power.
As nuclear aims expanded both during and afterWorldWar II, scientific ex-
pertise and engineering experience merged. Yet so-called atomic scientists
were the most visible representatives of the postwar field, and American
engineers increasingly sought greater recognition of their nonsubordinate
role as nuclear experts. Large companies in the United States supplied the
engineering labor for this new technology and played an important role in
defining the nature of their nuclear expertise, repeatedly renegotiating the
hierarchy of science versus engineering. The most influential was E. I. Du
Pont de Nemours, responsible for the earliest plutonium-production reac-
tors at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Hanford,Washington, between 1942 and
1946, and of the next generation of reactors at Savannah River, South Caro-
lina, between 1950 and 1989. In these facilities, the company integrated
technical experts to create a sustainable nuclear workforce unlike the career
niches fostered at the new national laboratories. This article explores the
transition of authority from scientists to nuclear engineers at those sites,
and DuPont’s role in shaping and consolidating this new expertise.1
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1. Other U.S. companies joined the field of reactor technology after World War II,
notably via the projects to build nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft for the U.S.
Navy and Air Force, respectively. These firms included General Electric, Westinghouse,
and Monsanto (discussed below), plus Fairchild, Convair, Pratt-Whitney, and Electric
Boat. By contrast, the early attempt by Farrington Daniels, director of the University of
Chicago’s Metallurgical Laboratory at the war’s end, to build a pile for power generation
was resisted by Oak Ridge scientists, owing in part to the project’s heavy reliance on
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The emergence of engineering knowledge is of considerable interest for
understanding how innovation and technical practices become embedded
in the working cultures of industries. While nuclear technology has gener-
ated vast scholarship, relatively little attention has been devoted to its engi-
neering specialists. Alfred Chandler and others have characterized DuPont
as a paradigm U.S. corporation and effective wartime contractor. David
Hounshell has sketched the company’s influence in creating the discipline
of chemical engineering, but discusses the professional dimensions of
nuclear technology relatively little, although nuclear-production sites and
lower-tier employees have received attention from others. Andrew Abbott
has defined an enduring framework for understanding the emergence of
technical experts in terms of competition among professions for intellec-
tual terrain, occupational sites, and status. Studies of twentieth-century
U.S. engineers have highlighted social and political dimensions, particu-
larly their engagement with wider corporate aims and developing themes
of social responsibility.2
The growth of nuclear technology parallels more recent technologies in
terms of the pace of its development and the nature of its organization. The
field was directed and rapidly expanded by government; the urgency of its
growth meant that scientists and engineers jostled, with theorization, large-
scale implementation, and practical insights coexisting. Richard Hewlett,
Monsanto engineers. See Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy, 1946–
1962 (Chicago, 1974); Stephen I. Schwartz, ed.,Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences
of U.S. Nuclear Weapons since 1940 (Washington, D.C., 1998); Richard G. Hewlett and
Jack M.Holl,Atomic Shield, 1947–1952 (Berkeley, Calif., 1969), 68–71; Robert A. Alberty,
“Farrington Daniels, March 9, 1889–June 23, 1972,” National Academy of Sciences Bio-
graphical Memoirs 65 (1994): 106–21. Thus DuPont was unique in overseeing successful
development of an integrated workforce ranging from designers and managers to reac-
tor operators.
2. Alfred D. Chandler and Stephen Salsbury, Pierre S. du Pont and the Making of the
Modern Corporation (New York, 1971); Harry Thayer, Management of the Hanford
Engineer Works inWorldWar II: How the Corps, DuPont and the Metallurgical Laboratory
Fast Tracked the Original Plutonium Works (Reston, Va., 1996); David A. Hounshell and
John Kenly Smith Jr., Science and Corporate Strategy: Du Pont R&D, 1902–1980 (Cam-
bridge, 1988), esp. 275–85; Thomas Parke Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of In-
vention and Technological Enthusiasm, 1870–1970 (New York, 1989); Gerard Colby Zilg,
DuPont: Behind the Nylon Curtain (New York, 1974); S. L. Sanger and Robert W. Mull,
Hanford and the Bomb: An Oral History of World War II (Seattle, 1990); Rodney Carlisle
and Joan M. Zenzen, Supplying the Nuclear Arsenal: American Production Reactors, 1942–
1992 (Baltimore, 1996); Russell B. Olwell, At Work in the Atomic City: A Labor and Social
History of Oak Ridge, Tennessee (Knoxville, Tenn., 2004); Andrew D. Abbott, The System
of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago, 1988); Edwin T. Layton,
The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the American Engineering Profession
(Cleveland, 1971); David F. Noble, America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of
Corporate Capitalism (New York, 1977); Terry S. Reynolds, ed., The Engineer in America
(Chicago, 1991). See also Antoine Picon, “Engineers and Engineering History: Problems
and Perspectives,”History and Technology 20 (1994): 421–36.
07_TEC52.3johnston 548–73:03_49.3dobraszczyk 568–  7/17/11  4:22 PM  Page 549
T E C H N O L O G Y A N D C U L T U R E
JULY
2011
VOL. 52
550
coauthor of the official history of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC), provided a first overview of how nuclear engineering followed hard
on the heels of science during the Manhattan Project. He noted that the war-
time and postwar administrations were top-heavy with scientists while
underrepresenting engineers, and Pap Ndiaye has similarly highlighted the
downgrading of engineers in the historiography of the Manhattan Project.
The AEC’s casting of engineers as a near-invisible constituency during the
early years of atomic energy complicates matters. Key participants likeWalter
Zinn and Alvin Weinberg, later directors of the Argonne and Oak Ridge
national laboratories, respectively, were physicists by training though reactor
designers by trade.While their institutions indirectly fostered the new field of
nuclear engineering, the present article argues that it was more effectively
prosecuted by DuPont and its senior engineer-administrators. By examining
the relationships between scientific and engineering cultures at DuPont sites,
we can assess how the field came to be appropriated by engineers.3
DuPont and the Wartime Gestation of Nuclear Specialists
Founded in Wilmington, Delaware as a gunpowder manufacturer in
1802, DuPont evolved to become an unusual American industrial company.
Establishing early industrial laboratories and relying increasingly on re-
search at the beginning of the twentieth century, it was also atypical in being
relatively self-sufficient: it normally designed, constructed, and operated its
plants in-house, rather than working with subcontractors. This combination
of attributes, which hinted at research competence, industrial accountability,
and efficient security, made the firm attractive to General Leslie Groves in
the autumn of 1942 to manage one branch of the Manhattan Project.4
DuPont’s involvement began during the autumn of 1942, when the U.S.
government asked it to serve as a subcontractor to Stone &Webster, a Mas-
sachusetts consulting-engineering company. Groves asked DuPont to play
a central role by liaising directly with the University of Chicago’s metallur-
gical laboratory to design, construct, and operate chain reactors as pluto-
nium plants. This was important in gestating a new discipline: a single, ver-
tically integrated company assumed responsibility for collaboration with
university scientists, building a burgeoning team of engineers to develop
atomic piles as industrial factories.5
3. Richard G. Hewlett and Franciscus Duncan, A History of the United States Atomic
Energy Commission (University Park, Penn., 1969); Hewlett, “Beginnings of Develop-
ment in Nuclear Technology,”Technology and Culture 17 (1976): 465–78, quotes on 477–
78; Pap A. Ndiaye, Nylon and Bombs: DuPont and the March of Modern America (Balti-
more, 2007), chap. 4; Alvin M. Weinberg, The First Nuclear Era: The Life and Times of a
Technological Fixer (New York, 1994).
4. Thayer.
5. Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, The NewWorld, 1939–1946 (Berkeley, Calif.,
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The choice of industrial partner shaped the conception of the engi-
neering tasks. Unlike Stone &Webster, which specialized in the physics-rich
field of electrical engineering, DuPont’s expertise lay in industrial chem-
istry. In November 1942, General Groves asked DuPont senior managers
and seminal chemical engineer Warren Lewis of MIT to evaluate the feasi-
bility of the proposed processes, all of which had been conceived by physi-
cists. Given their role as assessors, DuPont managers understood their task
to be the evaluation, refinement, and optimization of the University of Chi-
cago’s process of plutonium manufacture as an industrial routine accord-
ing to established management techniques. Thus DuPont would scale up
laboratory conceptions to a viable industrial process.6
The University of Chicago’s Metallurgical Laboratory (“Met Lab”) team
directed by physicist Arthur Compton viewed the organization differently,
defining the required expertise as a cluster of subdisciplines directed by sci-
entists. Three groups of physicists were attacking the problem of designing
a chain reactor; a separate chemistry division studied plutonium chemistry
and uranium purification on a laboratory scale; and a production division,
led by physicists Eugene Wigner and John Wheeler, was working on design
studies to scale up this knowledge for production plants. Compton in-
cluded nonscientists on his staff, appointing Thomas Moore of Humble Oil
and Refining Company as chief engineer of the lab and head of an engi-
neering council to advise the lab on plutonium-production processes. Al-
though Compton’s group was unusually proactive in incorporating engi-
neering expertise, it was positioned as subordinate within the hierarchy.7
1969); Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project (New
York, 1962).
6. Crawford H. Greenewalt, “Stine’s Memorandum,” in Hagley Library and Archives,
Wilmington, Delaware (hereafter Hagley): E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Atomic Energy
Division, including Clinton, Hanford, and Savannah River administrative records, 1957
series 1, box 1, 27 November 1942. The two other competing processes, which sought to
manufacture uranium rather than plutonium, were the “California project” (electro-
magnetic separation of U-235 from U-238, pursued by Ernest Lawrence’s radiation lab-
oratory at the University of California, Berkeley) and the “New York project” (electro-
magnetic separation of uranium by thermal diffusion, pursued by Harold Urey’s team at
Columbia University). On physicists’ colonization of electrical engineering, see Daniel
Kevles, The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America (New
York, 1977); on the relationship to chemical engineering, see William F. Furter, ed.,His-
tory of Chemical Engineering (Pittsburgh, 1980) and Terry S. Reynolds, Seventy-Five Years
of Progress: A History of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1908–1983 (New
York, 1983).
7. The council worked with Compton’s nuclear physics, chemistry, and theory divi-
sions. At the end of June, Charles C. Cooper, the assistant director of DuPont’s technical
division, was seconded for chemical engineering, and John Howe, from General Electric,
for electrical engineering. A month later, Moore added Miles C. Leverett from Humble
Oil for general engineering. That autumn Compton also appointed Martin D.Whitaker,
former chair of the physics department of New York University who had worked with
Enrico Fermi, to head pile design and construction.
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From the standpoint of the engineers, however, the project was still de-
cidedly academic in orientation. The problems and potential solutions of
plutonium production were at this point entirely theoretical: no chain reac-
tion had yet been demonstrated, and plutonium was available only in
microgram quantities, which were too small to reveal its chemical proper-
ties or appropriate methods of separating it from other fission products. As
to the reactor itself, suitable materials, designs, and properties were too
uncertain to make a production unit or even a pilot plant. To varying
degrees, the scientists and engineers alike viewed the project as beyond
their individual expertise.
The forced marriage between Met Lab and DuPont fostered the hybrid
expertise of nuclear engineering. It allowed engineers to gain an equal
rather than subordinate role in defining the intellectual terrain of the new
subject and in prioritizing research. This power shift, played out over the
latter part of World War II and resuming in the early 1950s, began with a
clash of technical cultures and ended with well-embedded occupational
sites, entrenched intellectual clusters, and increasingly clear-cut profes-
sional expectations.
Engineering versus Science: Critiquing Early Pile Design
This production project was unlike DuPont’s typical industrial problems
and required new expertise. There were no specialists in large-scale nuclear
processes akin to chemical engineers to offer a suitable background for the
particular novel problems to be faced. Moreover, the science itself lacked
adequate details upon which to found a factory-scale process.8 Key DuPont
participants had to rapidly absorb the fundamentals of nuclear physics,
while also grappling with the problems they perceived in the already-estab-
lished design practices of scientists working on nuclear piles. DuPont
assigned senior manager Crawford Greenewalt to act as liaison withMet Lab
scientists, and his project diary offers valuable insights into Met Lab’s
progress, DuPont’s assessments, and their interactions with scientists.9
8. The industrialization of radioactivity did have prewar exemplars, but they incor-
porated few relevant technoscientific aspects. Radium, for example, had been isolated
from crude ores and employed in medical treatments and commercial applications like
luminous paints; see Edward Landa, Buried Treasure to BuriedWaste: The Rise and Fall of
the Radium Industry (Golden, Colo., 1987); Xavier Roqué, “Marie Curie and the Radium
Industry: A Preliminary Sketch,” History and Technology 13 (1997): 267–91; and Maria
Rentetzi, “The U.S. Radium Industry: Industrial In-House Research and the Commer-
cialization of Science,”Minerva 46 (2008): 437–62.
9. Crawford H. Greenewalt, “Manhattan Project Diary,” 3 vols. (hereafter Greenewalt
Diary), in Hagley, 1889. With an MIT degree in chemical engineering, Greenewalt
(1902–1993) joined DuPont in 1922 to work successively in six departments, most im-
portantly in managing the development of nylon. He became president of the company
in 1948, and then chairman (1962–67).
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Through 1942 the scientists had been building cubic piles ten feet on a
side, and had found that these assemblies multiplied the radioactivity of an
artificial source of neutrons. They aimed to scale up these experiments,
with plans to demonstrate the feasibility of a self-sustaining chain reaction
by year’s end. Anticipating a successful outcome, Met Lab scientists already
planned a series of reactors, including an experimental one to be built in
the Argonne forest near Chicago, comprising a latticework of some twenty-
five feet in diameter of uranium oxide, uraniummetal, and purified graph-
ite. A second pile—the pilot plant or semi-works—would be constructed at
another site, identified as “X.” Identical in form to the first, the second pile
would, however, allow the chain reaction to run for weeks at a time at a sus-
tained thermal output of some 1,000 kilowatts. To enable this the scientists
envisaged the pile to be encased in a copper or steel jacket and filled with
helium gas to conduct heat and contain radioactive gases and airborne
materials, the exterior being sprayed with water and air-cooled by fans.10
DuPont managers were disconcerted by the signs of engineering naïveté
in this plan. The Met Lab physicists conceived plutonium production by
what they dubbed “Pile 2” as a batch process, rather than as engineers’ pre-
ferred continuous-flow plant; after a month of operation, the pile was to be
shut down for a week or two to allow radioactivity to decay before being
dismantled to recover the uranium fuel. While batch processes were nor-
mally less complex than continuous-flow systems, radioactivity introduced
novel problems, even for managers familiar with toxic chemical-produc-
tion processes. As the pile would generate some 100,000 curies of radioac-
tivity—the equivalent of 100 kilograms of radium, far in excess of the
world’s current supply—Met Lab planned to rotate operators “so as not to
build up too much without recuperation,” and to make a trade-off “be-
tween uranium danger and rapidity of construction.” Thus the project’s
pilot plant would introduce novel health issues that were to be settled by a
combination of empirical estimates and compromise.11
Greenewalt noted that Met Lab’s scheme for obtaining plutonium ex-
10. Ibid., vol. 1 (1942), 2–3, 11–31. For complementary though sparse overviews, see
Hewlett and Holl,NewWorld, 174–80, and Arthur Holly Compton, Atomic Quest: A Per-
sonal Narrative (Oxford, 1956), 161–75.
11. Greenewalt Diary, vol. 1 (1942), 28. The curie is a unit of radioactivity defined
as 3.7  1,010 decays per second, which is approximately the decay rate of one gram of
radium. The roentgen is a measure of ionizing radiation; namely, the ability of a radioac-
tive particle or energetic ray to liberate electrons from atoms. One roentgen is defined as
the radiation that will liberate one electrostatic unit (esu) of charge from a one-cubic-
centimeter volume of dry air. Greenewalt’s notes summarized the Met Lab’s current
understandings: that “humans can take 0.1 ‘R’ [roentgen] unit per day,” but the biologi-
cal effects of radiation depend upon its variety (e.g., X-ray, alpha particle, or neutron);
the “roentgen equivalent man” (rem) unit was later introduced to account for this. On
radiation hazards in defining the identities of French nuclear workers, see Gabrielle
Hecht, “Enacting Cultural Identity: Risk and Ritual in the French Nuclear Workplace,”
Journal of Contemporary History 32 (1997): 483–507.
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ceeded even these tentative safety limits. The plan was to tear down the ac-
curately machined and meticulously positioned graphite bricks via a
remotely operated circular saw to cut away the copper jacket, followed by a
boom crane with vacuum-operated suction cups to grasp and place each
graphite block on a moving belt. The uranium blocks would be similarly
directed to a hopper and a tank for chemical processing. The plutonium-
extraction process, which was still sketchy, would require remote agitation
and subsequent jacketing to isolate the product. The radioactive dust and
oxide were hazardous, and volatile fission products would be discharged via
a tall chimneystack when winds were favorable during the separation
process.12 The pile and separation facilities would be surrounded by some
seven feet of concrete, and the leftover soup of products, still highly radio-
active, would be stored indefinitely in shielded tanks. Scientists had
planned to perform these operations remotely, with their vision restricted
to a long, water-filled observation hole and periscope having a remotely ad-
justable mirror at its far end.
Met Lab’s reliance on such hazardous and untested schemes unsettled
the DuPont delegation, particularly when it learned that the lab’s scientists
had already moved forward in the planning for a third, full (rather than
pilot) production pile. On the positive side, this third pile would enable a
cyclical rather than a one-time batch-production process, thereby avoiding
some of the wastage and complexity of laboriously building and remotely
disassembling the pile. Yet this pile also had to be periodically unloaded of
its uranium fuel by using a procedure that appeared to be complicated and
dangerous. The proposed Pile 3 would generate some 100 times more plu-
tonium, heat, and radiation, thus requiring active cooling by recirculated
helium gas filtered to remove radioactive particles. The cylindrical reactor
was designed for fuel rods to be withdrawn vertically by cranes and handled
remotely for chemical processing.13
Moreover, a Met Lab group led by Wigner, Gale Young, and Leo Szilard
also described its plans for a distinctly different fourth pile design, thus
demonstrating the volatility of the design environment. Under considera-
12. By December 1942, Met Lab’s plans called for each separation plant to be four
miles from other facilities, with the “plant village for workers to be ten miles to wind-
ward of the nearest stack,” a main highway or railroad ten miles away, and a town at least
twenty miles from the nearest stack (Greenewalt Diary, vol. 1 [1942], 101). As a DuPont
report later summarized, “each cubic foot of radioactive gas must be diluted with as
many as 100 trillion cubic feet of atmospheric air to assure safe conditions”; see “100
Area facilities and operations,” in Hagley, 1957 series 3, box 58, folder 5, September 1945.
Subsequent experimental tests using oil smoke confirmed the potential dangers from
inadequately dispersed stack emissions; see Peter B. Hales, Atomic Spaces: Living on the
Manhattan Project (Urbana, Ill., 1997), 144–50. On the long-term concerns at Hanford,
see Michele S. Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear
Site (Lincoln, Neb., 1997), chap. 4.
13. Greenewalt Diary, vol. 1 (1942), 12–14, 32.
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tion for scarcely a few weeks before DuPont came on the scene, the plans
for Pile 4 were even more speculative than those for Pile 3. It would be
cylindrical and use hollow uranium tubes with an aluminum lining. A
fluid—possibly water, liquid bismuth, or a diphenylamine compound—
would cool the individual uranium tubes. The engineers recognized that
this design multiplied potential problems: water had a relatively high neu-
tron absorption and would lower the reactivity of the pile and thus its abil-
ity to transmute plutonium; it also reacted corrosively with uranium, re-
quiring the fuel to be encased in a protective sheath of aluminum. On the
other hand, bismuth—a liquid metal at the reactor operating tempera-
ture—might be affected by high irradiation in unpredictable ways. And a
diphenylamine hydrocarbon could polymerize or carbonize if overheated,
thereby clogging the tubes, reducing coolant flow, and potentially causing a
thermal explosion.14
Faced with ambitious goals, misplaced confidence, and a notable lack of
engineering rigor in the existing plans, DuPont engineers were increasingly
concerned and divided on the feasibility of the designs. Tom Gary, manager
of DuPont’s design division, and F. W. Pardee Jr., the supervising engineer
of its engineering department, felt that Met Lab’s planned production reac-
tor had design flaws, questioning “whether it is even possible to build this
unit—much less operate it—as designed at present.” They estimated that it
would require at least two years to engineer.15 DuPont engineers were more
impressed by Met Lab’s ideas about a reactor based on a heavy-water mod-
erator, at least in terms of its mechanical design and operating feasibility,
and felt that it had been prematurely rejected merely because of an inade-
quate supply of heavy water. They informed Compton (and, at a later meet-
ing, Groves and senior administrator James Conant, chair of the National
Defense Research Committee) that the DuPont team placed its short-term
confidence in a proposal by the University of California’s Radiation Labor-
atory to design efficient calutrons (electromagnetic mass spectrographs to
separate uranium isotopes) and argued that, for plutonium production, a
heavy-water pile designed collaboratively between physicists and engineers
was the option most likely to succeed. In the process of apportioning re-
sponsibility, DuPont proposed an intellectual shift in the balance of power,
moving it away from precariously scaled-up science to an engineering dis-
cipline constructed from scratch.16
14. Ibid., 69. The specific diphenylamine compound was unidentified.
15. Ibid., 68.
16. The moderator (or “slow downer,” as Greenewalt dubbed it [ibid., 3]) reduces the
energy of neutrons to ensure their capture by a uranium nucleus and allow transmuta-
tion to plutonium. See ibid., 3, 45, 65–68, 88–91, 104; Crawford H. Greenewalt, “Stine’s
memorandum,” in Hagley, 1957 series 1, box 1, 27 November 1942.
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17. Greenewalt Diary, vol. 1 (1942), 111–14.
18. Ibid., vol. 2 (1942–43), 2.
19. Ibid., 3–4.
Wilmington Engineers versus Chicago Scientists
Despite their expectation that this unlikely project would be nipped in
the bud, DuPont’s managers continued to reassess their engineering con-
servatism in light of scientific enthusiasm. When Compton took Greene-
walt to watch Fermi’s prototype pile approach criticality (the operating
point at which a self-sustaining nuclear reaction occurs), Greenewalt was
swept along by the moment. As an engineer, he noted an amalgam of obser-
vations: how the neutron count “kept increasing by leaps and bounds”; how
the pile “responds beautifully to control devices”; and how the neutron
concentration in the room during the final “power flash” “rose well above
the tolerable limit and the gamma radiation to just above the tolerable
limit” for a daily human exposure. Overall, he recorded, it was “much bet-
ter than expected. It was for me a thrilling experience.”17
Encouraged by the demonstration, DuPont’s executive committee
decided to take on the Chicago project, establishing the “TNX” division in
its explosives department, with chemical engineer Roger Williams assum-
ing practical responsibility and Greenewalt’s own role formalized by his ap-
pointment as technical director.18 Within days, Greenewalt began to worry
about the project’s hierarchy. Groves had wanted him to serve as Compton’s
executive assistant, but Greenewalt opted instead to “stay in the DuPont
setup” and “to ‘watch’ Compton and see to it that the research went in a way
that would provide the right technical information at the right time.” He
realized, however, that without his having authority over the Chicago
group, he would have to see to this through “diplomacy and pleading.”
Greenewalt knew he “couldn’t successfully ‘boss’ the physicists” and thus
welcomed Compton’s acceptance of the relationship.19
The disciplinary ranking in the project had to be renegotiated. Meeting
with Compton and his senior colleague Norman Hilberry, Greenewalt
noted that Compton had set ideas regarding the difference between scien-
tific and industrial research and decided to begin what he called “mission-
ary work” to convince Compton that the difference was more a matter of
terminology than otherwise. Greenewalt balked at the organization chart
identifying a head of “developmental engineering,” arguing that the Chi-
cago engineering group should be small and consultative rather than ex-
perimental, and that such a project required DuPont supervision. And
when he and Wilmington colleagues discussed the design of the second
pilot-plant pile with Met Lab personnel, Greenewalt was exasperated to
find their ideas sketchy and disorganized. He spoke privately to Compton’s
senior engineers Thomas Moore and Miles Leverett, deeming them to be
equally discontented and dominated by the physicists. His Wilmington
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20. Ibid., 5–12, quotes on 5–7.
21. Physicist John Wheeler, a member of Compton’s team, had calculated that if the
control rods were pulled fully out, uranium metal could vaporize and deposit a lethal
concentration of radioactivity over a five-mile-radius area, which was far too large for
any feasible army evacuation plan of northern Illinois (ibid., 20, 73–75).
22. The Argonne and Oak Ridge national laboratories became the centers of U.S.
reactor expertise throughout the second half of the twentieth century.
superiors agreed that DuPont must lead the engineering. This was to be an
intentional colonization of engineering perspectives into a scientific
stronghold: “I believe,” Greenewalt recorded privately, “we must infiltrate
pile design in spite of the fact we aren’t very welcome.”20
Within weeks of joining the project, the DuPont staff consequently
began to make firm design decisions. Fermi’s demonstration experiment
had shown that even a large air- or water-cooled graphite pile would likely
work as a chain reactor. Water was unappealing because of anticipated cor-
rosion problems and helium cooling seemed worst of all, with its unsolved
problems in unloading uranium fuel and the need for an airtight enclosure
and efficient blowers to circulate helium, which was in short supply. Roger
Williams correspondingly ordered hisWilmington pile designers to plan for
an air-cooled graphite pilot pile, and to delay design of the production piles.
Even more peremptorily, Greenewalt made decisions affecting not just
pile design, but locations also. Supported by Groves and Compton, he
argued that Fermi’s pile must be moved from the university grounds to a
new location in the nearby Argonne forest—a safe distance from Chicago.
He also directed that the second pilot-plant pile could not be built at Ar-
gonne, because of its much larger operating power—a thousand kilowatts
rather than a handful—and the possibility of a catastrophic radiation
release or sabotage.21 Instead, the pile would be built at Clinton, Tennessee,
a few miles from the Oak Ridge uranium-separation facilities being
planned for the Manhattan Project. Compartmentalization of expertise of-
fered cleaner working relationships: Greenewalt argued that Argonne
should be dedicated primarily to the experimental work of physicists, while
Clinton would be devoted to production. This single siting decision had
enduring consequences for the division of U.S. nuclear expertise, which
would henceforth be divided between Chicago/Argonne and Oak Ridge.22
Such bold decisions were made cautiously, however. Greenewalt was
concerned that he had usurped Compton’s authority, thus rendering overt
the new egalitarian partnership envisaged by the engineers. As he predicted,
the arrangements aggrieved many of Met Lab’s physicists. The group plan-
ning the Argonne pilot plant—now to be relocated to the Tennessee hills—
threatened to resign. Compton himself was upset that the Argonne site
could not be used for both physics research and pilot-plant production. In
February 1943 Groves and Greenewalt met with Met Lab group leaders to
assuage the growing engineering–science rivalry. Greenewalt advanced his
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23. Greenewalt Diary, vol. 2 (1942–43), quotes on 23, 85, 88; see also Hewlett and
Holl, NewWorld (n. 5 above), 186–88.
24. Abbott (n. 2 above); on Wigner’s assessment, see Sanger and Mull (n. 2 above),
16.
25. Greenewalt Diary, vol. 2 (1942–43), 154, 168 (20, 31 March 1943).
26. Ibid., 21–22. Greenewalt suggests that while Szilard was a loose cannon, Wigner
was consistently a representative of the critical younger scientists; Wheeler, on the other
hand, proved to be an effective intermediary between the Chicago and Wilmington
teams.
27. Thayer (n. 2 above).
disciplinary framework even further, casting the scientists as educators for
the new field and as junior members of the production team. In effect, the
roles of scientists and engineers would have to be more closely, perhaps in-
distinguishably, combined. He reported the atmosphere as “a bit tense.”23
Yet the abrasive situation was not reducible simply to engineering ver-
sus science. DuPont’s engineering conservatism, combined with near arro-
gance about project management, jarred against the more pragmatic exper-
imental culture operating at Met Lab. Wigner, leader of Met Lab’s theory
group and a physicist with chemical engineering training, argued that his
team’s expertise was essential to guide every stage of the process: designing,
constructing, testing, and operating a chain reactor to generate plutonium.
As discussed by Abbott, such contestations over methodology, competence,
and authority are more likely in such heterogeneous environments.24 Wig-
ner further argued that DuPont was too “diversified” to be able to do a good
job on design and construction, and both he and Szilard threatened to
resign from the project. Over the following weeks, subsequent meetings
with Wigner led Greenewalt to record privately that he was “not too hope-
ful that he will ever see things our way.”25 To defuse potential intimidation
of more junior engineers by the scientists, Greenewalt recommended segre-
gation: DuPont engineers would stay inWilmington, and his technical divi-
sion would be the “leg men” responsible for liaison and transfer of infor-
mation, thus bypassing entrenched hierarchies.26
The renegotiated science–engineering balance was supported by Du-
Pont’s distinctive corporate culture, which designed, constructed, and often
operated its own industrial plants; most other U.S. chemical companies of
the period subcontracted extensively.27 As a result, DuPont engineers were
not just a transitory nuisance for Met Lab scientists, they were in for the
long haul. Through the first half of 1943 Greenewalt began to wax opti-
mistic on piles and their possibilities. Meeting with Fermi and others about
heavy-water piles, he mooted the postwar possibilities for the plutonium
project, musing about piles as primary power sources for DuPont chemical
plants and envisaging the design of small mobile reactors. Moreover, at-
tending a celebratory dinner with Compton marking the six-month anni-
versary of the first fission, both chatted of peaceful applications, such as
power generation and radioactive tracers for organic chemistry, the use of
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28. Greenewalt Diary, vol. 2 (1942–43), 88, 134, 239; Alice Kimball Smith,A Peril and
a Hope: The Scientists’ Movement in America, 1945–47 (Chicago, 1965), 19.
29. Greenewalt Diary, vol. 2 (1942–43), 342 (21 September 1943).
30. Weinberg (n. 3 above), 48.
31. Greenewalt Diary, vol. 3 (1944–45), 18 (15 January 1944); Sanger and Mull (n. 2
above), 26.
the bomb for postwar peacekeeping, and the inevitability of government
sponsorship. Such activities would require DuPont to expand its expertise
in new directions.28
Hybrid Expertise: The Industrialization of Plutonium at
Clinton and Hanford
The first opportunity for a genuine scientific and engineering collabo-
ration was the pilot-plant pile at Clinton. Designed primarily by physicist
Weinberg, one of Wigner’s assistants, the Clinton pile, dubbed “X-10,” im-
pressed DuPont engineers as much as Met Lab scientists. Fermi’s original
pile at the University of Chicago had been detail-designed and procured by
Stone & Webster, but had been planned and assembled by Met Lab staff.
But X-10, as Greenewalt observed, showed impressive attention to details
and mechanical precision. Responding to early DuPont critiques, it was the
first engineered pile in existence.29 Greenewalt’s battles had ensured that a
considerable number of Met Lab scientists were relocated to Tennessee to
test and operate X-10, and to train a series of reactor operators for later
transfer to Hanford’s large production reactors. This close association
sometimes relegated the scientists to subordinate or coequal roles with
DuPont engineers and production workers, and provided an environment
to disseminate the scientists’ special expertise. Weinberg described the
atmosphere as “more of a DuPont pilot plant than a University of Chicago
research centre.”30
Begun in April 1943, X-10 in Tennessee was followed by three produc-
tion reactors at Hanford, with the first commencing operations in late
1944. But the planned Hanford facilities were markedly different from
Clinton’s pilot plant, because X-10 was air-cooled; each large Hanford pile
used Columbia River water to dissipate a hundred times more heat, while
generating proportionately more radiation and plutonium. In this new
industrial environment DuPont specialists assumed a more senior role.
Technical segregation was no longer an option: reactor technology on the
industrial scale would be tackled by close association between DuPont
engineers and scientists from the Met and Clinton labs.
Greenewalt, Compton, and Williams agreed that, during the start-up of
the first pile, senior Chicago scientists would be needed, with Fermi “on tap.”
Even DuPont senior managers assumed low-status roles like shift supervi-
sors—a model that impressed Met Lab scientists like Norman Hilberry.31
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32. Samuel B.Allison to RogerWilliams, Chicago, 13March 1944 (Greenewalt Diary,
vol. 3).
33. Nathan Sugarman, quoted in Smith, 16–17. Indeed, Greenewalt had been
instructed by Groves “not to discuss salaries with Chicago people since this brings about
kicks as to disparity on salary matters” (Greenewalt Diary, vol. 2 [1942–43], 298).
34. W. Overbeck, “Instrument Department Functions and Organization to July 1,
1945,” in Hagley, 1957 series 5, box 50, folder 16, 14 August 1945, exhibit A.
35. John Marshall, “Plant assistance (physics) to Jul 1 1945,” in Hagley, 1957 series 3,
box 58, folder 4, 17 September 1945.
DuPont sought an integrated hierarchy, with lower-tier scientists assigned to
the plants for the duration. The scientists were not eager to become indus-
trial employees, however. The explanation of their director, Samuel Allison,
to Williams illustrates the prickly status relations between the two organiza-
tions. Discussing the “considerable difficulty in finding physicists on our
staff who are willing to enter the employ of the DuPont Company and thus
assist in the operation of the Hanford plant,”he identified three contributory
factors relating to the hierarchy of engineering–science expertise. First, the
physicists considered the “discovery of our process to be the greatest achieve-
ment of the science of physics,” and felt that “an organization run by physi-
cists should always have a prominent place in directing its development.” By
joining DuPont “as individuals in subordinate positions,” he argued, “the
prestige of physicists . . . is greatly diminished.” Second, the younger scientists
had been directed“by physicists of world-wide reputations,” and they did not
find any such men in prominent positions within Hanford’s organization.
And finally, most physicists preferred “an academic life to one on service to
an industrial company,” and “their chances of obtaining an academic posi-
tion from that location would be distinctly poorer than they would be at the
Metallurgical Laboratory which has direct University connections.” Allison
consequently proposed “loaning” the Chicago physicists.32
This encounter reveals the concerns of status and career progression in
scientists’ identity, and hints at more. As later recalled by one of the young
Met Lab scientists, such resistance had the further aim of eliminating the
salary differential between DuPont engineers and others at the same level.33
Despite this stance, however, a growing number of scientists and engineers
coexisted at Hanford, with close working relationships forged in the instru-
ment and technical departments, whose skilled personnel came from sen-
ior staff at Wilmington’s headquarters, a few directly from Argonne and
Met Lab, and a large contingent from the Clinton lab. Indeed, half of the
new department traced back to Compton’s Met Lab, as carefully tracked by
DuPont: the company was eager to ensure that experts were involved
directly in identifying and solving start-up problems, and the supervisor’s
summary documented the hidden genealogy of scientists, engineers, and
technicians who came to man the Hanford piles.34 This “pile engineering”
division also included “a stable working unit of capable physicists [as] an
integral part of the plant organization.”35 Half of the physics section had
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physicist husbands—also came to Hanford for senior technical posts. Notable among
them were Leona Marshall Libby, an associate of Fermi and the only woman present at
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38. Sanger and Mull (n. 2 above), quotes on, respectively, 129, 132, 63.
39. F. Gast and C.W. J.Wende, “Reactivity experience and control to July 1, 1945,” in
Hagley, 1957 series 3, box 58, folder 4, 20 September 1945. For scientists’ account of the
incident, see Compton (n. 10 above), 182, 191–94; and Weinberg (n. 3 above), 29–30.
been employees of Met Lab, with seven engaged in the construction and
operation of the experimental piles at Chicago and Clinton.36 The addition
of analytical chemists and chemical engineers swelled the technical depart-
ment’s personnel to 1,009, including 275 engineers, 78 scientists, and 85
technologists.37
Despite this melting-pot environment, some divisions nevertheless re-
mained betweenMet Lab scientists and DuPont engineers; for example, John
Marshall recalled that physicists clustered socially, and David Hall observed
that it was “kind of cliquey, with not much intermingling with DuPont.”
However, for Herbert Anderson, the successful working relationships were a
revelation: “Friction between the DuPont people and the Met Lab scientists
was always a problem [but] so many details have to be followed, and only by
having a huge engineering organization can you attend to that.”38
Scientific and engineering knowledge co-mingled at the site of the reac-
tors. During the nine wartime months of operation, adverse physical phe-
nomena were discovered, explained, and counteracted. The best-known
example of the latent dangers in this unexplored terrain was the unantici-
pated drop in power from the first Hanford reactor after its first few hours of
operation in November 1944. Physicists eventually ascribed the problem to a
fission product, xenon-135, which proved to be a strong absorber of neu-
trons and so smothered the chain reaction. The reactor had been conserva-
tively designed by DuPont engineers, with an excess of channels through the
graphite for uranium fuel rods. When fully used, these compensated for the
“xenon poisoning,” therefore driving the chain reaction on.39
But this episode—an oft-told tale that vaunts scientific insight and
problem-solving—was paralleled by other operational discoveries pursued
by engineers. For example, the “Wigner disease” showed that the graphite
bars of the reactor became distorted after intense irradiation by neutrons.
After the first fewmonths of operation there was already a perceptible bow-
ing of the piles from expansion, and distorted fuel channels could jam fuel
elements and potentially rupture. Further engineering problems with
graphite continued to surface. By August 1945, just days before the drop-
07_TEC52.3johnston 548–73:03_49.3dobraszczyk 568–  7/17/11  4:22 PM  Page 561
T E C H N O L O G Y A N D C U L T U R E
JULY
2011
VOL. 52
562
40. Hood Worthington, “Pile technology—effect of operation on graphite modera-
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box 58, folder 4, 13 September 1945; “100 Area facilities and operations” (n. 12 above).
41. Greenewalt Diary, vol. 2 (1942–43), 295 (28 August 1944); “Hanford Story, chap
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ping of the atomic bombs on Japan, the supervisor of the piles, DuPont en-
gineer HoodWorthington, was warning of a drop of 30 percent in thermal
conductivity and a comparable increase in breaking strength. Both, he
feared, could prove catastrophic. Worthington characterized the loss of
conductivity as “the most severe heat transfer problem ever encountered,”
and the increase in breaking strength for the graphite suggested that brit-
tleness might ensue, which could result in disintegration or crumbling of
the graphite. For this, no curative measure seemed likely, apart from re-
building the piles from scratch.40
Yet another concern was the“Szilard complication.”Szilard had suggested
that energy would be stored in the graphite by neutron collision in a fashion
analogous to the cold working of metals. Local overheating might then
release this energy suddenly with catastrophic effect, a situation that DuPont
engineers avoided by higher-temperature operation to anneal the graphite.
DuPont continued to operate the piles, but warned administrators that their
operating lives were limited. DuPont’s matter-of-fact site history, written in
the house style employed for all of its industrial plants, noted that “the pro-
duction facilities at Hanford that DuPont turned over to General Electric had
major operational problems.” These episodes identify the Hanford reactor as
a large-scale experiment in which the engineers confirmed scientific hypoth-
eses and pressed for more detailed empirical investigations.41
The combined actions of Met Lab and DuPont personnel, then, were
seminal in defining the expert character of U.S. reactor technologists. A
grudging cooperation developed at the shared worksites, breeding special-
ists who were unlike prewar models of physicists and industrial chemists.
At these sites, expertise was acquired and disseminated through the first
formal courses and on-the-job training and was segregated by security
rules. From these wartime roots, U.S. nuclear engineering developed into a
unique form.42
Nevertheless, the Hanford experience appeared unpromising as the
launching pad for a new intellectual field based on reactor technology. The
contingency of the enterprise was appreciated by all: meticulous industrial
planning allied with uncertain physics; chronic pessimism among several
of its key actors; and unsettling discoveries after just a few months of oper-
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44. The Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry, or Nye
Committee (1934–36), of the U.S. Senate documented the profits of the U.S. chemical
and munitions industries and led to the popular conclusion that the country’s entry into
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ation, revealing that the piles were aging rapidly and unpredictably. The
ongoing interaction between the engineers and scientists was an abrasive
hodgepodge of deep research, urgent mitigation of known problems, and
fallback planning for further contingencies. DuPont engineers, as much as
Met Lab scientists, were eager to end this bumpy collaboration as soon as
wartime duties allowed; postwar activities, it seemed, would have to be
scaled down, slowed, or abandoned.
Consolidating Postwar Expertise: DuPont’s Atomic Energy
Division and the Savannah River Plant
As this narrative suggests, the distinct categories of technical expertise
were distributed along an industrial–academic axis. Chemical engineers
had directed some aspects of the wartime nuclear work; indeed, the term
“reactor” has a longer lineage in the technical culture of chemical engi-
neering than in that of nuclear physics. The confrontations between Du-
Pont engineers and Met Lab scientists owed more to institutional cultures
than to personality conflicts; the same was true for the American compa-
nies that became associated with postwar nuclear energy. Indeed, from
1946, when the AEC assumed responsibility for what the Manhattan Pro-
ject had begun, the entire field was unusually malleable and nuclear engi-
neering continued to be shaped by the particular constellation of compa-
nies and national laboratories involved.43
The DuPont Company had entered into its Manhattan Project responsi-
bilities without enthusiasm. The Chicago process required a significant frac-
tion of its resources, but profit-making had not been pursued; the company
was still sensitive to its identification in 1936 as a “merchant of death” prof-
iteering from World War I munitions manufacturing.44 DuPont required
profits, however, and its managers carefully considered the possibilities of
commercial atomic energy and the technical expertise required while mak-
ing its postwar plans. Greenewalt was seduced by conversations with Met
Lab scientists, encouraging him to weigh up DuPont’s involvement in post-
war atomic energy. On the “pro” side, he noted that “this is a new field of
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gov/ddrs: Hanford EngineeringWorks archive D19803392, 1951; Richard G.Hewlett and
Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953–1961 (Berkeley, Calif., 1969).
great scientific importance in which DuPont has some specialized knowl-
edge which may lead to commercial or by-product developments,” and that
the advertising value of publications in the field could improve the com-
pany’s university relationships and recruitment; on the “con” side, however,
Greenewalt noted that “suitable physics personnel will be difficult, if not
impossible, to get,” and prospects looked better for other kinds of funda-
mental and applied research, because “no commercial applications can be
foreseen now or even guessed at except perhaps in the field of luminous or
sterilizing paints.” Indeed, he judged the chance of recovering money spent
to be “very remote,” with patents not likely to be exploitable before they ran
out. None of those possibilities included plutonium manufacture.
Greenewalt’s analysis hints that he had not conceived nuclear workers as
being a new kind of specialist at all (“organization might comprise a direc-
tor [preferably a physicist], 1 theoretical and 5 experimental physicists and
4 chemists”). Despite enthusiasm for the novelty of the new domain, Du-
Pont decided that other commercial fields—notably the marketing of nylon
and other synthetic fibers and films—offered greater postwar profits. At the
contract’s completion in 1946, DuPont turned over management of the
Hanford Engineering Works to the General Electric Company (GE).45
The contingent evolution of an industry and associated specialists is
best illustrated by the experience of DuPont at the second major U.S.
industrial atomic-energy project, at Savannah River. Together, the Hanford
Engineering Works and Savannah River Plant were the largest U.S. reactor
installations for a quarter-century. And—being designed for production,
not research—they were seminal in creating a cohort of reactor designers,
nuclear-process workers, and working environments based upon the Du-
Pont model.
In late 1948 Greenewalt, now president of DuPont, was approached by
the AEC to undertake a review of all chemical processes bearing on pluto-
nium production. Unlike its Manhattan Project duties, the examination of
uranium recycling, plutonium-separation chemistry, and handling of fis-
sion products and wastes appeared to fit comfortably within DuPont’s or-
ganizational remit. As the DuPont survey was being completed in the sum-
mer of 1949, however, the political context shifted under the company’s
feet. That autumn, with the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb and
the success of Mao Zedong’s forces in China, the Truman administration
and the AEC sought to recast the nuclear-energy program to ensure a larger
and diversified military stockpile. In early 1950, DuPont consequently was
asked to plan another plutonium facility to parallel Hanford’s capacity.
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process defects,” including the wasteful treatment of uranium—simply by depositing
slightly depleted uranium in underground storage—and production of radioactive by-
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47. H. F. Brown, “Atomic Energy Division,” 2 August 1950; Brown, “Atomic Energy
Survey Committee,” 11 July 1950; and letter, R. M. Evans to C. A. Nelson, 9 August 1950:
all in Hagley, 1957 series 2, box 6.
48. Worthington (n. 40 above). Alternately described as chemist, chemical engineer,
and consulting nuclear engineer between the late 1940s and 1960, Worthington’s occu-
Plans for the plant site, near Aiken, South Carolina, were announced that
November as the Savannah River Plant (SRP).46
The company again undertook the design, construction, and operation
project as a cost-plus-fixed-price contract. The project is notable in several
respects: it incorporated a wide-ranging survey of the rapidly expanding
state of the art, revealing the range of expertise then available; it adopted
technical solutions at variance with the military projects then under way,
thus expanding the U.S. state of the art in new directions; and, finally, it
constructed the first postwar American model for an industrial nuclear
workforce.
While responsibility for the SRP was seen more as a national duty than
a commercial opportunity, DuPont laid the groundwork for future direc-
tions. The company set up an atomic energy division (AED) within its
explosives department, like its wartime TNX division. DuPont’s AED con-
formed to the company’s traditional management structures, but it also
established posts, administrative niches, and network nodes for the new
expertise in atomic piles. This would not be a rerun of its wartime activi-
ties. As R. M. Evans, the assistant general manager of the AED, explained to
the AEC manager overseeing the new facilities, DuPont would be responsi-
ble for all aspects of the project, including its science-based design. Its ex-
plosives department would have prime responsibility, defining the scope of
work and specifying the process requirements, in addition to operating the
functioning plant; the engineering department would occupy the role of
architect-engineer and general constructor, and its design division would
develop the final design and handle procurement; and the construction
division would perform the field construction.47
This integrated management structure for the AED required, however,
the nurturing of atypical DuPont personnel, of which some had had expe-
rience at the wartime Clinton and Hanford sites and others were young
engineers and physicists chosen to expand company expertise in atomic
energy. Worthington, the assistant manager of the technical division, had
served as chief supervisor of the Hanford piles, a role involving both tech-
nical expertise and administration.48Worthington was to be responsible for
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1957 series 3, box 12, folder 3), 13 December 1950; and R.W. Fulling to F. C.VonderLage
(Hagley, 1957 series 3, box 12, folder 6), 14 May 1954.
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reactor development at the SRP. Physical chemist Dale Babcock had been
involved in the start-up operations of the Hanford piles. And C. W. J.
Wende, a technical specialist at wartime and postwar Hanford, was to
become the most active senior pile designer for the SRP. Most of those
assigned to key posts were transferred from other DuPont commercial
plants and laboratories, but new titles highlighted the new activities: within
months, personnel called “atomic engineering managers” (more for their
division association than for functional responsibilities) were recruiting
new employees and identifying AEC contacts.49
Seeking Expertise in Pile Networks
Despite this concentration of DuPont experience, most of these senior
personnel had lost contact with the growing field since 1946, when the
company’s responsibility for Hanford had ended and a blanket of security
concealed new developments. During the years immediately following the
war, a clear notion of the scope and content of nuclear engineering had not
emerged at Hanford or other industrial sites, which remained almost com-
pletely obscured to public view and, indeed, to contemporary analysts.
During the intervening four years, the AEC had established burgeoning
projects in the research and development (R&D) of atomic piles, and also
the technoscientific staff to support them. The new national laboratories
more publicly took the reins, compartmentalizing R&D and reasserting the
ascendancy of the scientists. For Zinn’s Argonne National Laboratory, the
successor to Met Lab, engineering was segregated to a separate “reactor
farm” in Arco, Idaho (later known as the Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory). As Zinn put it: “the testing station will be a
place to build reactors and get experience in their operation, rather than to
do experiments such as will be done on the research reactor at Argonne by
the physicists, chemists and biologists. The reactors at Idaho will provide
space for engineering types of experiments.”50
The SRP administrators consequently explored the institutional and
intellectual networks of expertise concerned with designing piles. The AED’s
technical division began a flurry of activity to liaise with AEC experts to
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channel their expertise into industrial implementation. This was, in some
respects, an amplified version of the wartime model: Met Lab had served
first as designers, then trainers, and finally consultants for DuPont engi-
neers, the shifting relationships having been facilitated by staff members
serving as technical liaisons—notably Greenewalt for DuPont and Wheeler
for Met Lab, with dozens of personnel from both organizations gaining sci-
entific and engineering experience, respectively. In the same way, the engi-
neers of the AED sought the heirs of Met Lab personnel, and they found
them principally at the Argonne and Oak Ridge national labs, successors to
the University of Chicago’s Met and Clinton labs. Unlike the wartime roles,
however, the SRP was understood as a sustainable operation that would
require a career workforce enrolled in an engineering perspective.51
The AED engineers shuttled between Wilmington and the Argonne,
Oak Ridge, and Brookhaven national labs during 1950 to discuss design de-
tails of the SRP reactors, fuel elements, and plutonium separation. After a
visit to the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, a postwar GE facility focusing
on atomic-power applications, Wende was surprised at how little informa-
tion was available and how much material was yet hidden. He noted that
GE had conducted a training course for pile engineers several years previ-
ously that had covered “much material which is not otherwise available in
coherent form.” He petitioned the AEC for a selection of classified materi-
als that addressed topics like pile physics and engineering, metallurgy, sep-
arations engineering, and separations chemistry that would cover the basic
sciences and pertinent developments for the Wilmington engineers, and
permission to build a classified information service for use by the DuPont
designers and eventual plant personnel. Security, which cloistered infor-
mation at the national labs, proved a recurring constraint on the develop-
ment of facilities and expertise at the SRP.52
The question of knowledge transfer was a perennial one for DuPont.
An early intention of SRP administrators was that a half-dozen or more
DuPont designers would be educated by the most formal route then avail-
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able: at ORSORT, the newly established Oak Ridge School of Reactor Tech-
nology, populated principally with the physicists who had worked on the
wartime Clinton and Hanford reactors. But as its director cautioned a
prospective student, this was a demanding course: “Competition among
the students is keen and generally stimulating; therefore, the advantage of
prior knowledge is emphasized. In particular, a working knowledge of
mathematics through the solution of boundary value problems is essential.
. . . Factual knowledge and a familiarity with elementary concepts in atomic
and nuclear physics are also essential.”53 Few DuPont staff members, it
seemed, had the requisite skills. Only Harry Kamack, a research project
manager in chemical engineering with Manhattan Project experience, was
admitted to ORSORT from DuPont’s first group of seven candidates.
Adapting the company to a self-sufficient workforce in nuclear engineering
thus required a shift to embrace the expertise of physicists.54
As Kamack reported to his superiors, the one-year course covered top-
ics essential for industrial reactor design, which included an analysis course
on the theory of nuclear reactors, a technology course featuring lectures on
engineering problems experienced in the design of piles, and a materials
course that looked at the properties of materials used in pile design. The
ORSORT program featured a final project in which small groups under-
took the design of a reactor.55 Even so, he was aware of the lack of consen-
sus in the field, with “many of the lecturers [having] decided opinions
about what is the best type of reactor, or reactor material, etc for the future,
and these opinions [varying] considerably from one man to another.”56
53. Letter, F. C. VonderLage to H. J. Kamack, in Hagley, 1957 series 3, box 12, folder
4 (“ORSORT 1953–54”), 21 May 1953; D. F. O’Connor, “Hanford Personnel and
Training Program,” in Hagley, 1957 series 2, box 12, folder 3, 31 August 1950.
54. Harry J. Kamack (1918–2009) had joined DuPont in 1942 and was assigned to
its TNX design group in 1943, serving at Met and Clinton labs and then at Hanford.
After his ORSORT training, he was to play a senior role in the design of the SRP reac-
tors. From among the forty-four government-sponsored students in that cohort of
eighty, he noted that twenty-nine were from twenty private companies and fifteen from
six government organizations, including the Bureau of Ships, Naval Reactors Branch,
Naval Research Laboratory, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, and the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity. The largest industrial groups included five students from Westinghouse, three from
GE, and three from the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics. The industry stu-
dents were mostly engineers—mechanical engineers being the largest single group—
with a few chemists and a fairly large group of physicists. See Kamack, “Report on year
of training at Oak Ridge School of Reactor Technology—1953–1954,” in Hagley, 1957
series 3, box 12, folder 4 (“ORSORT 1953–54”), 8 September 1954.
55. Harry J. Kamack, “ORSORT curriculum,” in Hagley, 1957 series 3, box 12, folder
4 (“ORSORT 1953–54”), 10 June 1953.
56. Harry J. Kamack, “Report on first term of ORSORT year,” in Hagley, 1957 series
3, box 12, folder 4 (“ORSORT 1953–54”), 20 January 1954.
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57. The heavy water plant at Trail, British Columbia—a by-product of a large elec-
trolytic hydrogen plant—produced about six tons annually by 1950, having generated
sixty tons altogether, of which thirty remained (Hagley, 1957 series 5, box 53, folder 10
[“Dana History, Startup through December 1952, 1953”]).
58. J. Walter Joseph and Cy J. Banick, “The Genesis of the Savannah River Site Key
Decisions, 1950,” in 50 Years of Excellence in Science and Engineering at the Savannah
River Site: Proceedings of the Symposium, May 17, 2000 (Aiken, S.C., 2000), available at
http://www.c-n-t-a.com/srs50_files/001joseph.pdf.
Shifting Hierarchies: Engineers as Research Instigators
In this urgent postwar environment DuPont engineers were again play-
ing catch-up to physicists. Ongoing disagreements between the successors
to the wartime Met Lab scientists and DuPont engineers reveal, however,
the evolving nature and shifting responsibilities of the specialists who were
beginning to call themselves “nuclear engineers.” While reliant initially on
knowledge transfer, the AED engineers challenged scientific authority in
their bid for self-sufficiency.
Early in DuPont’s 1950 contract to survey plutonium-production proc-
esses, it had been decided that any new reactors should be moderated by
heavy water, rather than by the graphite used in the wartime Clinton and
Hanford piles—as the DuPont consultants had advised in 1942. The Han-
ford piles had revealed the capricious properties of graphite as an engineer-
ing material, and the stockpile of heavy water could now be augmented by
new production facilities.57 Moreover, the manager of AEC operations for
the SRP, Curtis Nelson, had been a colonel in the Manhattan Project. He
served at Hanford and then as the AEC liaison officer at Canada’s Chalk
River site, where he became familiar with its heavy water–moderated reactor
technology.58 His lobbying supported DuPont’s own engineering analyses.
The company’s engineers accepted the design and construction of large
heavy-water production plants at the SRP as a relatively routine task in
industrial chemical engineering, but the challenge of heavy-water reactors
was another matter. The technology was beyond their experience, and the
close reliance of the SRP designers on Argonne experts mirrored, in some
respects, the wartime experiences between DuPont and Met Lab; indeed,
some of the same personnel were involved. The episodes reveal the distinct
perspectives operating at the national labs and production facilities, and, by
extension, the differentiation of what could be called “nuclear applied sci-
ence” at the national labs from“nuclear engineering”as conceived at DuPont.
Wende was conscious of the scientific uncertainties underlying some of
the necessary engineering choices. Four months after beginning his round
of visits to the national labs, he reported to Worthington about an unex-
plained transient phenomenon in Argonne’s heavy-water research reactor.
Worthington, in turn, wrote to Zinn for further information, recalling the
discovery of the suite of problems with the first Hanford reactor and not-
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59. Letter, Hood Worthington to Walter H. Zinn, 21 December 1950, and telex,
Walter H. Zinn to HoodWorthington, 21 December 1950, both in Hagley, 1957 series 4,
box 54, folder 2.
60. C.W. J. Wende, “Visit to Argonne, January 3 and 4, 1951,” in Hagley, 1957 series
4, box 44, folder 2, 12 January 1951.
61. Ibid.
ing his concern about the consequences for unexplained science in an in-
dustrial design. Zinn, perhaps sensing a destabilization of scientific author-
ity akin to the wartime Met Lab troubles, telexed dismissively that the
“behavior [is] probably understood but perhaps not quantitatively. In any
case it is not behavior which we would expect from the equipment you have
under consideration.”59
Although he was junior in status to both Zinn and Worthington,
Wende doggedly pursued the issue with Wigner, who had moved to Oak
Ridge after the war, andWheeler—both veterans of the wartime skirmishes
and, with Zinn, the most senior of U.S. reactor experts. At his next trip to
Argonne,Wende reiterated that DuPont engineers wanted to continue ana-
lyzing this effect, citing the experience with xenon poisoning “as a case
where failure to analyze a small effect in the Clinton pile had resulted in a
nearly catastrophic failure to predict a large effect in the Hanford piles.”
And in a separate discussion of experimental tests, Wende again admon-
ished Zinn with historical precedent, noting the inadequate exploration of
the Wigner and Szilard effects in graphite:
The measurements so far were barely enough to begin to show us
where some of the problems are; and that, rather than to terminate
such experiments, it was our feeling that they should be continued
and probably expanded into full-scale critical experiments. The
history of exponential experiments in graphite lattices was cited
as an error of omission, which should not happen again: namely,
that such experiments were dropped by the Met Lab in 1944, and
that much important information was not discovered about these
systems until the group at Hanford undertook such work in
1949–50.60
The same visit generated yet another technical confrontation when
Zinn asked why Wende had been advocating for graphite piles, rather than
for a heavy-water version. Wende returned to the gulf between scientific
explanation and engineering implementation: “While the heavy water piles
have the potential advantages of greater flexibility and greater excess neu-
tron production, these advantages are potential and not demonstrated; and
Argonne’s work over the past six months has certainly demonstrated that
major areas of ignorance exist which will not be cleared up until many
months after the first heavy water pile is started up.”61 The episode reveals
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62. The SRP did not acquire its own research or pilot-scale reactors, but cooperation
with other sites within the nuclear establishment continued under the supervision of the
AEC. As specified by DuPont, “a permanent nucleus [of SRP experts] is expected to
maintain contact with other research centers within the AEC framework and to advise
the plant technical forces on process improvement and development work”; see letter,
R. M. Evans (assistant general manager of the atomic energy project) to Curtis A. Nelson
(operations manager of the AEC), 9 August 1950, Hagley 1957 series 2, box 6, File—Ad-
minstrative policy correspondence, general, 1950–1963.
63. Some 12 percent of them were engineers and 6 percent were biological, medical,
attitudes that had been seeded during the war: Wende, an experienced
though relatively junior engineer in a technologically conservative com-
pany, was prepared to challenge the most senior pile scientists in the coun-
try. His criticism did not concern scientific detail, but the manner in which
Argonne personnel related ongoing exploratory research to engineering
decision-making. Their science, involving the interplay of subtle physical
phenomena with large-scale materials, was engineering in orientation, but
not in style. Argonne’s brand of applied science, claimed Wende, was not
engineering and was not a viable match to DuPont’s drive for industrial
reliability.62
Conclusion
Over more than a decade DuPont found itself at odds with developing
U.S. scientific practice in atomic energy. Both in 1942 and again in 1950 the
company assumed responsibility as integral designer, builder, and operator
of plutonium-production reactors with the diffident cooperation of physi-
cists. The company had little corporate intent or technical expertise in
nuclear technology, and its specialists were imperfectly configured to mesh
with the limited training provided by the physicists either at wartime Oak
Ridge or postwar ORSORT. Skirmishes nevertheless allowed the engineer-
ing perspective to advance and erode existing hierarchies of knowledge and
practice.
Atomic piles forced DuPont to accommodate a new specialty. Both
Hanford and the SRP demanded adaptations of DuPont’s working culture.
By the end of the 1950s, the SRP had a technical profile quite unlike other
DuPont operations: while a typical 29 percent of its operations workforce
consisted of managerial, engineering, scientific, and other professional per-
sonnel, engineers outnumbered scientists by only a factor of two. Both pro-
duction sites promoted an engineer-led, physics-supported working envi-
ronment—the inverse of Argonne—and the SRP evinced a dominance of
the engineering perspective that had struggled to assert itself at Met Lab
and Oak Ridge, and that had scarcely attained parity with science at war-
time Hanford.63
07_TEC52.3johnston 548–73:03_49.3dobraszczyk 568–  7/17/11  4:22 PM  Page 571
T E C H N O L O G Y A N D C U L T U R E
JULY
2011
VOL. 52
572
or physical scientists, most with bachelor’s degrees. The works technical section, com-
bining engineers, chemists, and physicists with responsibility for technical, scientific, and
safety issues, employed most of this new breed. See Atomic Energy Commission, “SRP
Fact Book,” in Hagley, 1957 series 5, box 54, folder 15, 25 November 1960.
64. DuPont, with its working culture of “almost haphazard, cut-and-try methods”
drawn from chemical engineering and industrial chemistry, was replaced by GE and its
electrical engineering systems approach; see Melvin Rothbaum, The Government of the
Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union (New York, 1962), 45–58, 88–90, 109–20, esp.
109. See also Ronald W. Schatz, The Electrical Workers: A History of Labor at General
Electric andWestinghouse, 1923–1960 (Urbana, Ill., 1983). OnWestinghouse’s adaptation
to new fields, see Thomas C. Lassman, “Industrial Research Transformed: Edward Con-
don at the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, 1935–1942,”Technology
and Culture 44 (2003): 306–39; and “History of the Savannah River Laboratory Volume
III—Power Reactor and Fuel Technology,” June 1984, in Hagley, 1957 series 5, box 54,
folder 12.
65. Robert Bothwell, Nucleus: The History of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (To-
ronto, 1988); Wilfred Eggleston, Canada’s Nuclear Story (Toronto, 1965); Ruth Fawcett,
Nuclear Pursuits: The Scientific Biography of Wilfrid Bennett Lewis (Montreal, 1994).
66. Westinghouse built the reactor of the first nuclear submarine, the USS Nautilus,
launched in 1954, based on a design developed with the Argonne National Laboratory.
In April 1989 it assumed management of the SRP from DuPont.
These episodes suggest a relatively ponderous adaptation of DuPont to
the new field of nuclear engineering, one that, as Melvin Rothbaum has
argued, was more readily taken up by GE. Instead of viewing the nuclear re-
actor, as DuPont did, as a versatile and malleable collection of plants for
producing a chemical product, GE viewed it as a product in its own right,
akin to the industrial transformers and generators by which it had made its
fortune.64 Evidence suggests that this was not merely a matter of differing
engineering cultures, but also of corporate reluctance. In 1956 the AEC
asked DuPont to apply the expertise it had gained from the SRP to the de-
sign of heavy water–based power reactors (broadly similar in principle to
Canada’s evolving CANDU designs).65 The slow progress of DuPont’s AED
engineers, however, required the AEC to reduce its pressure, shifting from
a goal of an operating reactor by 1962 to open-ended design studies. Even-
tually these also were abandoned, and with them DuPont’s potential influ-
ence on nuclear-power engineering.
Nevertheless, DuPont was committed to nuclear engineering as a viable
profession in a way that the national laboratories at Argonne and Oak
Ridge were not. Where Met Lab and postwar Argonne had compartmen-
talized and segregated scientific and engineering expertise, DuPont’s facili-
ties sought to integrate them during the war, and to subsume them within
the new specialist field of nuclear engineering after the war. While other
U.S. companies, notably GE and Westinghouse, benefited indirectly from
this early appropriation of authority in reactor design, it was DuPont’s
organization of a reactor workforce involving engineers, technicians, and
supporting scientists that shaped the U.S. nuclear environment.66
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DuPont’s Met Lab, Oak Ridge, Hanford, and SRP experiences were,
then, emblematic of the shifting attitudes about nuclear-energy specialists
in the United States. The “atomic scientists” so visibly representing the
postwar field belied the reality of nuclear energy: U.S. engineers were
claiming a position beside, not subordinate to, their scientific colleagues. Ex-
pertise was to be distributed and production would be reliant on specialist
workers trained within the AEC network according to traditions emerging
from the Argonne and Oak Ridge national laboratories—and DuPont.
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